This is not to say that it is impossible for America to renew its power base and reassert its power preponderance. The encouraging signs (at least for Americans) are that the United States occupies a healthy position in the likely future leading sectors of the global economy – information technology, telecommunications, computing, high technology manufacture, biotechnology, etc, and is at the forefront of next generation weapons research. It is possible that the next millenium will begin with another "American Century". However, this is to say the least, unlikely. Again, if we look to history, we see that only once has a global power managed to renew its dominance after a period of decline – Britain managed to follow a commanding eighteenth century role with a nineteenth century Pax Britannica.

In order to determine the likelihood of America being able to match or even surpass this feat, it is necessary to consider what sorts of things are necessary for global dominion, and which powers are likely to challenge the United States for this role. The traditional realist perspective is that power is a product of military capability. However, in determining which countries are likely to vie for world leadership, we must consider a certain type of capability. Even if a country possesses the largest military force on the planet, it is unlikely to exert much influence beyond its borders and immediate neighbors, unless it also has the means for projecting force across the globe. This power projection capability is what distinguishes a dominant regional power from a truly global power.

Obviously overall military spending is important, but we must take into account relative global reach capacity in terms of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles and naval power (especially in terms of aircraft carriers). America has by far the largest military budget in the world, and there is little or no evidence of the so-called "peace dividend" reducing defense expenditure. The United States also possesses the largest nuclear arsenal. However, nuclear weapons are of dubious worth as tools of force projection, or even as agents of leverage backing up American foreign policy. They may very well serve as a deterrent to potential aggressors against the United States, but it is unlikely that the threat of their first use by America would have much influence upon the non-threatening policies of other states. What is perhaps of more import is the possibility of America using its nuclear delivery systems with non-nuclear warheads. Most crucially, America has a monopoly of super-aircraft carriers, and commanding lead in regular carriers.

However, countries with sufficient economic and technical resources can produce aircraft carriers relatively easily. Thus the next component of power that must be considered is some measurement of the economic base of countries. It is on these grounds that it is easiest to discount Russia as a serious challenger for global hegemony in the next century. Although militarily still a great power, geographically the largest state in the world, and the controller of the strategically vital "Heartland", Russia's global reach capability is eroding. Its nuclear stockpile is of little strategic worth, its delivery systems are of declining significance, and its navy is largely confined to home waters or, worse, is left moldering in dock for want of funding. Worst of all, the Russian economy appears to have entered free-fall, and although it is possible, and indeed probable that it will eventually recover, it is unlikely to do so in the near future. Thus Russia would appear not to have the capacity to restore its global reach capability.

By far the most convenient measure of economic health is a comparison of relative gross national product (GNP). Here, perhaps, we can see some evidence of American decline that would cast doubt upon the potential for another American century. As previously mentioned, America's share of total world production has been falling for some time (as has its share of world trade). Japan and the European Union have been making great inroads into this area of American of preponderance. Indeed, economically, it is no longer correct to think in terms of a unipolar world economic system. Let us now turn to consider the overall challenges posed by these two rising powers.

Japan already has the third largest naval budget in the world, and most certainly has the economic and technological resources to build a global reach capability almost overnight. However, although the dangers of Japan's geopolitical neighborhood, combined with increased rivalry with the United States, the regionalization of the world system (discussed below), and the possibility of the removal of the American security umbrella would seem to give plenty of political motivation for an expanded Japanese role, it is by no means certain that it will take this step. There is considerable internal and external pressure for Japan to focus exclusively on economic matters.

The Japanese public shows very little enthusiasm for the expansion of security commitments, and as long as Japan remains a democracy it will be difficult for any politician to go against such feelings, especially as they are backed up by constitutional underpinnings. The other great powers in the region, America, China and Russia would also be extremely resistant to any Japanese expansion. Their motivations and interests for doing so might vary, but they would be united in thwarting Japanese attempts at establishing a significant regional military capability, let alone something that amounted to a global reach capacity. Finally, Japan's Asian neighbors and trading partners still hold painful memories of Japan's previous bid for military expansion and regional, if not global dominion. Although these small states might be considered too weak militarily and politically to do much to resist Japan should it decide to once more embark upon such a path, they do have the capacity to exert considerable economic influence upon their larger neighbor.

Japan is geopolitically the most vulnerable of the potential twenty-first century world powers. It occupies a similar position to that of Britain in the last century, but without the strategic resources. In 1914 the German general Friedrich von Bernhardi wrote that "[e]very Englishman is convinced of the necessity to maintain the command of the sea, since he realizes that not only the present powerful position of the country, but also the possibility of feeding the population in case of war, depend on it." Japan is similarly dependent upon sea-lanes being kept open, but reliant for this upon the good favor of one of its competitors. If it were to try to take over this responsibility itself, the suppliers of a significant proportion of Japan's food, raw materials, and markets for Japanese goods could very well react in a way that would effectively hamstring these very efforts.

Japan's vulnerability leads us to consideration of other factors that determine power capability, namely human and material resources. Japan is an island nation with too few people to provide a significant internal market, and too small a land mass to feed even its relatively small population or to provide the natural resources it needs for its military-industrial complex or existing rate of energy consumption. Thus Japan is unlikely to be able to expand its global influence, and indeed may even begin a period of gradual decline due to a potential reduction of global free trade and the erection of tariff barriers to which Japan is particularly vulnerable.

The European Union is better endowed in these respects, especially if it continues its process of expansion. However, there are other considerations that limit the potential of the EU. The chief of these is that, as yet, the European Union lacks the centralized decision-making apparatus necessary for coherent and efficient strategic planning. Military co-operation is at best minimal, and proposals for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) are among the most divisive issues facing the Union. Furthermore, although a combined European military-industrial complex underpinned by huge economic resources, 400 million or more citizens and a large, continental land-mass would make a bid for global domination possible, the European Union is starting from a relatively small military base. Europe is a potential challenger for the future, but not necessarily a particularly likely one.

India is a state that is sometimes raised as an outside leadership candidate for the twenty-first century. It has a large population base - indeed, it may eventually become the most populous state in the world. It has a large territorial mass under a centralized administration. It already possesses nuclear weapons, a large military and an expanding navy that may be upgraded to true global reach proportions. It also has a growing economy and, in particular, is an increasingly significant player in leading sector technology fields. However, it is hindered by internal diversity and dissent, and a geopolitically isolated position, leaving it most likely to remain a significant regional player rather than a global challenger.

Perhaps the greatest threat to America's future role is embodied in the phenomenal rise of China. China has the greatest potential in terms of human and material resources the world has ever seen. Its population is huge and essentially ethnically homogenous, and the territory under its direct political control makes it the third largest state in the world. It occupies a prime geopolitical position bordering on the strategically vital core of the Eurasian landmass, yet still has more than sufficient coastal access to facilitate the launch of a blue water naval capability. It has a centralized and efficient foreign and domestic policy decision-making mechanism, and has shown itself remarkably resistant to internal dissent. Even if China fails to maintain its present staggering rate of economic growth, a more modest rate would still see it overtake America as the world's largest economy well before 2050.

Aside from economy, what previously served to hold back China from asserting a greater role in world politics was lack of political will. Centuries ago Chinese naval vessels roamed as far as the shores of Africa. However, the imperial administration ordered the ships to be destroyed and China entered a period of isolation. There is no guarantee that what has become the traditional inward-looking policy of successive Chinese administrations will continue once China is again in a position in to assert itself forcefully upon the international stage, despite the repeated assertions of its leaders that their country holds no expansionist designs. Indeed, there is every indication that both politicians and public support actions to redress the wrongs suffered by China at the hands of other powers, and to take steps to guarantee the future inviolability of the Middle Kingdom.

Furthermore, what in the future will become internally insatiable demands for energy and food, will impel China to adopt a more global orientation. On China's western frontier security and energy concerns coincide, and in this region China is already adopting a more assertive foreign policy. The vast under-populated regions to the north (with correspondingly massive reservoirs of untapped mineral resources) inevitably also exert an attractive pull upon Chinese policy orientation. To the south China is becoming increasingly assertive in its policies towards its former Southeast Asian tributary states, and new bases and basing rights on the Spratleys and Myanmar respectively show an increased concern with expanding naval resources beyond a purely local brown water incarnation. Finally, to the east, the relative (and maybe even absolute) decline of China's rivals may create on opening, or even a partial power vacuum that will be filled with great aplomb by the no longer sleeping dragon.

Thus, based on the criteria of military spending, global reach capability, economic performance, human and material resources, geographic positioning, centralized decision-making and political will, we can see that there are two major candidates for world hegemony in the next century – China and the United States. Russia and the European Union have somewhat lesser chances of achieving the same position, depending on the successful implementation of rejuvenatory policies in the former case and evolutionary ones in the latter. Despite much hyperbole about the forthcoming Asian century, it is extremely unlikely that either Japan or India will dominate the world by the year 2050. It is furthermore inconceivable than any country outside of these six should become the world's hegemonic power.

It is of course possible that no one state will achieve sufficient preponderance of power to elevate it to hegemonic status. Indeed, for a number of theorists, a multipolar world, rather than a succession of hegemonic orders, is considered the historical norm. Certainly there are those that would argue that we are returning to such a multipolar scenario, with two or more of the above listed contenders competing for, and as a result sharing, global dominion, as none is able to impose its will upon the others. There are a number of ways in which such a multipolar world order could be structured.

One possibility that has received considerable attention since the end of the Cold War, is that of a global concert of democratic states. This worldview is reflected in President George Bush's "New World Order" and the endism of Francis Fukuyama. For many it is the fulfillment of Kant's vision of "perpetual peace" - no competing ideology can now hope to challenge the dominant democratic paradigm, thus all states are moving inexorably towards eventual membership of the democratic club. Membership of this club, once it becomes all-encompassing, precludes further armed conflict between states - democracies tend not to fight each other, as power rests in the hands of the people, and it is the people who suffer in times of war. It is also felt that greater openness within and between states in the international community decrease one of the chief causes of war – conflict through misunderstanding, miscalculation and distrust.

Giving further support to this notion are the various aspects of "globalization". Chiefs among these are the components of economic integration and interdependence that make it inherently unprofitable and thus irrational to fight major wars (multinational corporations, the twenty-four hour global stock market, transnational capital flows, etc.) Finally, environmental and social challenges facing humanity as a whole (global warming, ecological diversity, the ozone layer, the energy resources crisis, Malthusian population concerns, aids and drugs) may increase the pressure for cooperation rather than competition among the various political subdivisions of humanity in the interest of species survival.

Proponents of this view cite as evidence the great wave of post-Cold War democratization not only in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, but also in South America, Africa and Asia. Even China, while resisting democracy per se, has been forced to accommodate a greater degree of openness in its economy and plurality in its civil society. The Uruguay round of GATT has finally been successfully concluded and a World Trade Organization established. The United Nations Security Council is no longer emasculated by rivalry between diametrically opposed and irreconcilable veto holders, and for the first time there exists the possibility of the rule of law operating in international society as it does in domestic.

However, one should not place too great emphasis upon the progress that global democratization has made in recent years. While many countries have been embroiled in regime transition, this has not necessarily led to democratic consolidation. As yet, Russia is a long way from being a "true" democracy, and, given its present economic and political woes, a return to some form of authoritarian rule seems at least as likely as further progress along the democratic path. China is even further from the attainment of this goal, and it is extremely unlikely (perhaps even impossible given China's population, history and political culture) that China will become a democratic state by the year 2050. Although there has been a wave of democratization, Samuel Huntington is correct to warn us that such waves are usually followed by corresponding (if more limited) waves of counter-democratic authoritarianism. Democratization tends to follow a two-step-forward, one-step-back pattern. In particular, states undergoing a regime transition are at their most volatile, a danger to their own people and to their neighbors. Likewise, one should not rely to greatly upon the continued integration of the global economy. Firstly, many analysts are of the opinion that the process is about to move into reverse, with increased tariff barriers placed in the way of free trade, increased economic regionalism and attempts at regional autarchy – perhaps even going as far as the development of exclusive regional trading blocs. Secondly, even if this were not the case, there is no guarantee that economic interdependence would lead to the elimination of war.

As far back as the beginning of the century, writers such as Norman Angell pointed out that warfare is no longer a rational instrument of policy for this very reason, yet this century has seen the bloodiest and most destructive wars in the history of mankind. The basic fact is that statesmen often do not act rationally, or act according to a different rationality than that of economic well-being. Furthermore, it is by no means certain that the global threats to mankind's existence will engender cooperation – indeed, many analysts would argue that Malthusian competition for limited resources is more likely to lead to a cut-throat world embodying Darwinian notions of "survival of the fittest".

This "realist" world-view has led to the emergence of an alternative multipolar vision of the future touched upon earlier – that of a world divided into competing politico-economic blocs. This is not a new concept. The German geopolitician, general and professor, Karl Haushofer, provided perhaps the most (in-)famous exposition of this view as a justification for German expansion during the Nazi period. Haushofer's pan-regions foresaw the world being divided into a number of autarkic political and economic zones, within each of which a single great power would hold sway and exploit the resources of vassal states and regions, excluding the influence and participation of its great power rivals. The model for these regions would be the role played by the United States in the Americas under the Monroe Doctrine – indeed, contemporary versions of this vision have referred to these regions as "Monroes".

The theoretical underpinning for this approach is the belief that hard "geoeconomics" functioning as instruments of national policy are not played out in terms of "win-win" cooperation as envisioned by the previous scenario, but rather as aspects of a zero-sum game. States are more interested in relative economic positioning and getting a larger share of the cake, than they are in increasing the size of the cake so that all may benefit albeit to a lesser extent.

Such economic realism does appear to be backed up by evidence of state behavior, and would also be supported by any moves toward economic regionalism as the ideology of free trade is undermined by competition for limited resources. However, analysis of world trade and investment patterns does not support the concept of emerging economic blocs, let alone regional political integration (with the exception of the European Union). World powers tend to interact primarily with each other rather than with peripheral states.

Furthermore, if no other power is able to establish dominion, then China is likely to do so by default. Following Mackinder's reasoning, one may view global history in terms of a continual struggle between the land powers of the Eurasian world-island and the sea-powers of the smaller surrounding landmasses and coastal regions. However, whereas Mackinder was apt to consider the balance to have decisively swung in favor of land powers with the advent of the railway, recent history appears to confirm the teachings of the previous few hundred years, that land powers are only able to gain dominion when naval powers are too weak to prevent them from doing so.

"Long Cycle Theory" presents the most statistically sophisticated analysis of these repeating sequences of struggles for dominance. The basic premise of the group of authors associated with this theory is that every hundred years or so history repeats itself, and has been doing so since the evolution of the international system five hundred (or as claimed by some, one thousand) years ago. The Long Cycle refers to the deconcentration and reconcentration of naval power/global reach capability within each of these hundred year blocks. Each cycle is broken down into four phases, the macro-decision or global war phase; followed by the world power phase when a single state has the overwhelming preponderance of global reach capability; then the delegitimation phase when the economic base of this global power concentration is undermined; finally the deconcentration phase when global reach capability is no longer concentrated within one state.

Modelski and Thompson point out that each global leader will normally dominate for two cycles of the global economy. These cycles are called K-waves after the Soviet economist Nikolai Kondratieff. The only exception to this pattern has been the four cycles of domination by Britain. Each power transition has resulted in a westward shift of the locus of the political and economic core of the world society. One interpretation of this process is that it gives further support to the vision of a Chinese century after a westward movement of the core from America.

However, another reading of Modelski and Thompson's data, is that America will prevail once more, although perhaps not in isolation – if we look at regional rather than state-centric orientation, we see that the core has resided in each region for four cycles, although usually with intra-regional power transference. Thus the next century could see a Western Hemisphere or Atlantic Community leader including the United States. This is an essential part of the Pan-Continental Concert dealt with in detail later in this paper.

Most theorists agree that whichever state eventually prevails, we are likely to be entering a period of global uncertainty and instability, when the declining sea-power based world leader is challenged by an ascending continental land-power. The dissynchronous relationship of power deconcentration and reconcentration cycles between the world system as a whole and the European subsystem have provided the impetus for previous confrontations of this sort. Such confrontations have normally been marked by a global hegemonic war. The more recent transitions (i.e. over the last five hundred years) have seen the spoils go to neither the regional challenger nor the declining world power, but rather to an alternative world sea-power allied to the ailing giant.

There are some ways in which history will not repeat itself. It is extremely unlikely that Europe will throw up a regional challenger to the global hegemon – indeed the European subsystem is no longer dissynchronous with that of the world system, but rather forms an integrated part of it. Moreover, Europe is no longer the chief locus of alternative power resources – that honor now belongs to the Asian regional subsystem. This is also an area where we do see a continued dissynchronicity – the concentration of power in Chinese hands going against the global trend of deconcentration. It has also been argued that a global hegemonic war is not inevitable, despite the evidence of history. This is as may be – perhaps statesmen will finally learn the lessons of history, and discover mechanisms for peaceful change in the international system. However, the moment of transition itself is unlikely to be avoided. The law of unequal growth dictates that things cannot remain the same – change is inevitable, and some states inevitably benefit more from change than others.

The moment of transition is likely to occur at some time within the time frame at present being considered, and for the reasons outlined above, a declining American hegemon is likely to be confronted by a rising China. The most pressing causes of tension are connected with China's search for resources and regional dominance. This could bring her into conflict with the Russian Federation over Mongolia, the Central Asian Republics, the former northeastern territories of China presently occupied by Russia, or the vast untapped resources of Eastern Siberia. Alternatively, a war could break out between China and India or Japan over regional preeminence or in the interest of settling old scores.

Any of these scenarios would most likely drag America into the conflict in an adversarial position to that of China, as the world leader attempts to perform its traditional role of preventing unipolar dominance of the world's most vital region. The same is true of the potential flash points of Taiwan, Southeast Asia, the two Koreas, and the Middle East, although here America would have added reason to become involved as it has security commitments connected with these territories.

Should a hegemonic war occur between the two, then neither is likely to be the winner, but rather a third party will seize the reigns of power – most likely a reinvigorated Russia, or a European Union with minds focussed and policy centralized by the conflict. The factors that would make a global war of hegemonic succession less likely are [1] both China and Russia making great strides towards democracy; [2] America's decline becoming so precipitous that it makes no effort to resist China's rise; [3] America's reinvigoration being so complete that China dare not challenge the world leader's supremacy, and so is forced to come to terms, attempting to achieve its goals through peaceful means.

The first two of these scenarios are extremely unlikely. Although it is possible that Russia could regain the momentum of democratization, it is virtually unthinkable that China will be able to do so within our timeframe. Many indicators may point to relative and even absolute American decline of a pace previously unmatched by any global leader, but it is unlikely that the United States will sink fast enough not to meet China moving in the opposite direction, particularly given America's strong position with regard to the next generation of leading edge technology. This leads us to the third scenario. Although America has considerable potential for renewal, it is doubtful whether America will be individually so dominant that it is able to coerce all potential challengers at will. In the future it may not on its own be strong enough to control China. Therefore, it is likely to seek to share the burden with those countries that share its values.

This leads us to the concept of a Pan-Continental Concert. This would move beyond the level of mere alliance to a more integrated security concept of global management through a single western-orientated, capitalist, democratic, hegemonic bloc. The core of such an entity would be the so-called "Atlantic Community" of Western Europe and North America. The central entities of this community, the European Union and the United States already enjoy a considerable degree of cultural, economic and political integration. However, in order to prevent any destabilizing challenge to this hegemonic power, it is likely that its two major components will be vigorous in recruiting a second tier of associated powers. We are likely to see a competition for economic, political and even military influence over the "floating powers" of Japan, Russia and India between the Atlantic Community and China.

Japan is orientated geoeconomically and politically towards the west, but geostrategically and culturally towards the East. It is vital therefore that the Atlantic Community is strenuous in its efforts to keep Japan in its camp through continued preferential economic and security treatment. The economic strength of the European Union must be used to buttress Japan's ailing economy, and America must continue its maintenance of a security umbrella amounting to protected status for Japan. Otherwise, it is inevitable that Japan will come to some accommodation with China, or in the absence of either such an agreement or adequate support from the West, Japan will fall to Chinese dominance (political, economic and/or military).

Russia is already showing some signs of coming to an accommodation with China – not surprisingly, as Russia is likely to be the first in the line of fire should the Chinese juggernaught start rolling. Russia is also resentful of Western aloofness, and is undergoing an extremely painful transition. The Atlantic Community needs to do its utmost in terms of actions designed to woo Russia and to recruit it to membership of the Pan-Continental Concert. Such measures are likely to include increased economic assistance and support for democratic consolidation, and a freeze upon NATO and EU expansion short of the territories of the Former Soviet Union. Russia should then be encouraged to take up associated status with both of these organizations. In order to assuage the fears of Russia's smaller neighbors, and in some measure to satisfy their aspirations, similar bilateral arrangements could also be extended to them.

India is already to a considerable extent aligned with the West, and under present circumstances certainly appears unlikely to shift its allegiance to China. Indeed, a war between the two is quite likely. Given these conditions and its isolated geographical position, it is not necessary for the West to recruit India to the Pan-Continental Concert. However, if such a regime is to amount to more than a purely cynical and power-political marriage of convenience, the world's largest democratic state should not be excluded from participation, support, and protection.

Thus the final picture would be a Pan-Continental Concert driven and directed by an Atlantic hegemonic core, promoting a global consensus in all three power arenas – politics, economics and security issues. China is of necessity excluded from such an arrangement, partly because of its inherent unsuitability and incompatibility, partly because such a degree of cooperation between other powers is only likely in the face of a threat from some "other". Whether a Western or a Chinese century will be underway by the year 2050 depends on the success of the Atlantic core in forming binding ties of association with the other powers.